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Banks, Small Business and Risk

Posted by Wendell Brock on Thu, Sep 16, 2010

In the recently passed legislation, the Dodd Frank Law, the FDIC is given the mandate to change the way it assesses deposit insurance premiums from banks, mostly based on risk. This will greatly impact small businesses, by limiting their access to capital through loans. Perhaps as much or more than the recent health care bill will.

First the Law

The law “defines a risk-based system as one based on an institution’s probability of causing a loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund (the Fund or the DIF) due to the composition and concentration of the institutions assets and liabilities, the likely amount of any such loss, and the revenue needs of the DIF. …allowing the FDIC to establish separate risk-based assessment systems for large and small members of the Deposit Insurance Fund.

“Over the long-term, institutions that pose higher long-term risk will pay higher assessments when they assume those risks. …should provide incentives for institutions to avoid excessive risk.” (the information quoted is found in the following paper about the new score card produced by the FDIC located at: http://www.denovostrategy.com/new-fdic-score-card/)  The new assessments will be based on a performance score, which will be comprised of three main elements: 1) CAMELS Score, 30%; 2) Ability to withstand asset-related stress, 50%; and 3) Ability to withstand funding-related stress 20%. It is the asset-related stress that has the regulators concerned and if an institution has too much risk in that category, it will also affect the CAMELS rating, as the regulators will perceive that management is not doing their job – that of taking care of the bank.

The banker’s number one job now it to make sure that the bank never becomes a problem bank, that may cause the regulators to pay on deposits; everything else is now ancillary to that goal.

Small Businesses

All small businesses are risk rated, based on their credit score, (or the owners credit score), which becomes the basis for easy or difficult access to credit at a financial institution. At times bankers make loans to small businesses, because they understand the business, the risk associated with the business and they know the owner, even though the credit may be simply o.k. (not great, but not terribly bad either).

This new way of assessing deposit insurance will now cause the banker to ask the question – how will this loan affect the bank’s portfolio and ultimately it’s DIF assessment? As bankers ask this question more loans will be turned down. This is not to say, that all loans should be written as applied for, but as the bell curve moves towards safety, it will certainly leave a larger percentage of good small business loans unfulfilled and business owners without the much needed capital to continue in business or to grow. And we all know that when small businesses don’t continue, or fail to grow, then lay-offs occur and unemployment lines increase.

Did Congress and the regulators think this one through completely? Is there a better way to asses risk?

Topics: Bank, FDIC, banks, Regulations, FDIC Insurance Fund, Loan Grading, Risk Management, Bank Regulations, Growth, small business

Banking and HR 2847: Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act

Posted by Wendell Brock on Thu, Jul 01, 2010

On March 18, 2010, President Obama signed HR 2847, unbeknown to most this law has several banking implacations/regulations and new taxes, even though it is not disclosed by its name: the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act.

Much of the press and commentary about the resolution has centered on the tax benefits it affords to businesses that hire new employees between February 3 of this year and January, 1, 2011.

What has gone mostly unnoticed is how these incentives will be paid for by the Foreign Account Tax Compliance provisions known in Title V of the Act as Offset Provisions.

SUBTITLE A

Part I: Increased Disclosure of Beneficial Owners

Financial institutions that make payments, on behalf of their customers, to Foreign financial and nonfinancial institutions must withhold 30% of payments made to those institutions, unless such institutions agree to disclose the identity of such individuals and report on their bank transactions.

The bank risk for not withholding the 30% is with the financial institution that initiated the transfer of funds – in other words, the bank will be responsible to send to the IRS the 30% it should have withheld. The individual sending the money will be responsible to get a refund from the IRS on their tax return. Also denies a tax deduction for interest on non-registered bonds issued abroad.

Part II: Under Reporting With Respect to Foreign Assets

Anyone with more than $50,000 in a depository or custodial account maintained by a foreign financial institution must report it. Underpayments resulting from undisclosed foreign financial assets will incur an enhanced penalty.

Part III: Other Disclosure Provisions

U.S. shareholders of a foreign investment company must file annual returns.

Part IV: Provisions Related to Foreign Trusts

A foreign trust has a U.S. beneficiary if the beneficiary's interest in the trust is contingent on a future event or such beneficiary directly or indirectly transfers property to such trust or uses trust property without paying compensation to the trust. Owners of foreign trusts must report them in their taxes, and they will be penalized if transfers to and distributions from such trusts aren’t reported.

Part V: Substitute Dividends and Dividend Equivalent Payments Received by Foreign Persons Treated as Dividends

A dividend equivalent payment is considered a dividend from a source within the United States for purposes of taxation of income from foreign sources and tax withholding rules applicable to foreign persons.

SUBTITLE B

Delay in Application of Worldwide Allocation of Interest

Delays until 2021 the application of special rules for the worldwide allocation of interest for purposes of computing the limitation on the foreign tax credit.

SUBTITLE C

Budgetary Provisions

Increases the required estimated tax payments for corporations with assets of not less than $1 billion in specified calendar quarters. Provides criteria for compliance with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010.

 

Topics: Banking, Bank Regulation, Bank Risk, Bank Regulations, Foreign Banks

Next-generation Compliance for Banks

Posted by Wendell Brock on Wed, Feb 17, 2010

Compliance. An issue most bankers don't relish. Often times it is explained away as a necessary evil! This approach makes difficult for the bank to stay on top of compliance issues and often leads to problems with examiners. This leads to compliance waves where the compliance officer works to get things ready for an exam or audit then the work load relaxes until the next exam or audit.

Based on the current state of affairs, most banks' find themselves overwhelmed with compliance workloads; they have limited staff and schedules, along with the increase demands from examiners, who want more risk management. Internal audits are conducted by just a few people, typically, they are reactionary, and they utilize outdated technology, if any technology at all. The workload is not slowing down anytime soon-if anything it is increasing.

What we propose is a complete rethinking of compliance-to what is called "Next-generation Compliance"-this is where banks are proactive with compliance rather than reactive. It smoothes out the waves and distributes the work throughout the organization, which makes the compliance load much lighter and much easier to manage. Such a change must happen on three levels: a bank's operational culture, their level of collaboration, and the technology used in audits.

I. Culture

  1. 1. Devise a compliance strategy
  2. Get executives onboard with the strategy
  3. Promote all team members to be proactive
  4. Create metrics to quantify the value of proactive compliance
    • Does compliance result in an increased speed of reporting?
    • Quality compliance management response?
    • The larger scope includes overall compliance simplicity?
    • Money and time saved?

 II. Collaboration

  1. 1. Include people from multiple departments in compliance audits
  2. Standardize process across all areas of compliance audits
  3. Be flexible, and have reasonable expectations
  4. Make your auditors business-focused, independent, strategists
    • They shouldn't be on an island
    • Promote productivity
  5. Communication with regulators
    • Involve them in the process early so they understand the improvements from the positive changes

III. Technology

  1. 1.Reassess your current compliance tools
    1. Is technology working efficiently for you?
    2. Break from the spreadsheet! You can't properly collaborate from a spreadsheet - there are easier ways
  2. Increase use of collaboration tools to centralize the compliance audit workflow
    1. With them, everyone can discuss and facilitate improved risk management
  3. Track the use of audit recommendations
    1. What good are recommendations if they aren't used?
    2. Provide continuous up-to-date analysis/status of risk management

Compliance and Banking

Regulators are asking for more risk management and compliance, but banks aren't able to address this increased workflow with more manpower. With tighter operating budgets, the solution is working smarter. Often times when a bank is not able, to deliver properly on compliance issues it results in the issuance of an MOU or a C&D to the bank. Restoration plans and strategies may be implemented and managed through continuous compliance.

If you're buying a bank, the regulatory hurdles are less. But modifying an existing bank's compliance processes requires a team effort; it's all about building a smarter bank!

If you're starting a bank, a culture of compliance can be built from the ground up as your institution evolves. A blank slate is easy to work with. But at the same time, new banks are subject to harsher regulatory scrutiny, which means compliance has to be a priority.

To learn more about Next-generation Compliance, click the link for more information. 

Topics: Buy a bank, Bank Risks, regulators, Bank Regulators, Bank Regulation, Regulations, Bank Policies, Risk Management, Bank Regulations, Building Smarter Banks, Start a bank, Smarter Banks, Restoration Plan, distressed banks, Compliance, Next-generation Compliance

Bair Says More Regulation is Needed

Posted by Wendell Brock on Mon, Nov 02, 2009

Sheila Bair argued to Congress last week that the government should "impose greater market discipline on systemically important institutions." Her rationale for the argument was that those large firms have been funded by the market as if they were too big to fail, while their management teams depended on faulty risk management practices; these circumstances, combined with ineffective regulation, created a the bulk of our current economic problems. Bair's commentary indicates that we will ultimately have much more regulation throughout the financial industry, simply because what happens to large institutions will trickle down to impact the smaller community banks.

Bair went on to say:

In a properly functioning market economy there will be winners and losers, and some firms will fail. Actions that prevent firms from failing ultimately distort market mechanisms, including the market's incentive to monitor the actions of similarly situated firms. The most important challenge now is to find ways to impose greater market discipline on systemically important financial organizations.

Shareholders, creditors to take losses

It is true that we need to create an effective, bailout-free system to unwind large failing institutions - and to do so without creating a financial tsunami that wipes out the rest of the economy. But the reality is that everyone will feel the impact of a large institution's failure. It is impossible that a CitiBank, Wells Fargo, Bank of America or Chase failure could result in only a slight ripple through the economy. Those closest to the institution will feel the pain the most and people on the far fringe, the least -- but it will be felt by all nonetheless. The government needs to stop trying to make our lives pain-free in all aspects of life. We simply cannot be shielded from ALL risks.

In the current meltdown, for example, shareholders felt the brunt of the financial crisis pain. Investing is an inherently risky enterprise, and to devise regulation that would soften the impacts of investment failure runs contrary to the tenants of our economic system. Because shareholders voluntarily took risks with the companies they invested in and supported, they should absorb the repercussions when those firms fail.

Bair agrees with this argument. She advises:

Under the new resolution regime, Congress should raise the bar higher than existing law and eliminate the possibility of open assistance for individual failing entities. The new resolution powers should result in the shareholders and unsecured creditors taking losses.

Bair also addresses the current priority given to secured creditors. Such creditors have, in the past, made credit decisions based on collateral value without thoughtfully considering creditworthiness as well. This puts the creditor at risk of default and forced liquidation, while encouraging lack of discipline in the market. Addressing this issue can help to minimize costs to receivership and spread out losses related to failures more broadly.

Other key points in Blair's testimony included:

  • Resolution of systemically important financial firm failures is currently managed through the bankruptcy process, where there is no protection for public interest.
  • Holding company affiliates are often dependent on the ongoing operations of systemically important firms. Regulation is needed to require these affiliates to have greater autonomy. Holding companies should have wind-down plans.
  • Open company assistance benefitting shareholders and creditors should be banned by Congress.
  • A Financial Company Resolution Fund should be established and pre-funded through assessments against large financial firms.
  • The FDIC should have authority to resolve "systemically important and non-systemically important depository institution holding companies, affiliates and majority-owned subsidiaries." This authority would allow the FDIC to maximize the value of the assets, particularly in cases where certain functions lie outside the FDIC's current authority.
  • The FDIC supports the creation of a powerful Financial Services Oversight Council to monitor and manage system-wide risks. The Council should be given a minimum rulemaking authority "that must be met and could be exceeded." The Council should oversee a group of regulators, but also have its own power to act if the regulators do not.
  • The full text of Sheila Bair's testimony can be found at: http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spoct2909.html

    Topics: FDIC, FDIC’s, Bank Regulators, Commercial Banks, Bank Regulation, Bank Regulations, Troubled Banks

    The FDIC’s NEW Advisory Committee on Community Banking

    Posted by Wendell Brock on Fri, Oct 16, 2009

    In May of 2009, the FDIC authorized the creation of an Advisory Committee Community Banking with the purpose that this committee would help the FDIC understand the particular issues that small rural and urban community banks face in the ever-changing financial landscape.

    The committee is consists of no more than 20 volunteer members from the community banks around the country along with small business, education, non-for-profit organizations and other individuals that use the services of these community banks. It is expected that the committee will have an annual budget of $300,000 and two full time FDIC staff people committed to serving their needs. The committee charter will last for two years unless it is renewed by the FDIC. The committee will also report directly to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the FDIC.

    The committee's first meeting was this week and below is the press release from that meeting. At the bottom is a link to the FDIC website where more information may be obtained about the meeting. We hope this positive for the community banking sector as they struggle under the weight of very difficult regulations, limited budgets, and with razor thin margins. They are scheduled to meet twice a year, so the next meeting should be in April.

    Press Release from the Advisory Committee on Community Banking

    At its first meeting since being established by the FDIC Board in May, the FDIC's Advisory Committee on Community Banking today discussed the impact of the financial crisis on community banks. Other issues addressed were regulatory reform proposals under consideration by Congress and their effect on community banks, the impact of FDIC supervisory proposals on these banks, and community banks' perspectives on funding the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund.

    "I was extremely pleased with the robust discussion among our committee members on issues that are so critical to both the FDIC and our nation's community banks," said FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair. "The committee members voiced a number of interesting ideas that they will pursue."

    The Advisory Committee was formed to provide the FDIC with advice and recommendations on a broad range of policy issues with particular impact on small community banks throughout the nation, and the local communities they serve. The committee is comprised of 14 community bankers from across the country, and one representative from academia.

    "We are fortunate to have so many highly respected professionals who are willing to volunteer their time and talents to help the FDIC analyze the issues most important to community banks," said Paul Nash, Deputy to the Chairman for External Affairs, and the Designated Federal Official for the Advisory Committee on Community Banking.

    The members' opinions on the FDIC's proposed rulemaking to prepay three years of deposit insurance assessments will be included in the public comment file.

    For more information on the Advisory Committee on Community Banking please visit http://www.fdic.gov/communitybanking/index.html.

    Topics: FDIC, Community Bank, Banking industry, Bank Regulators, Commercial Banks, Regulations, Bank Regulations, FDIC Advisory Committee

    A De Novo Strategy for the FDIC: Prepaid Insurance Premiums

    Posted by Wendell Brock on Thu, Oct 01, 2009

    The ongoing wave of bank failures related to the financial crisis continues to impact the health of the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). At the end of the second quarter, the DIF balance was down to $10.4 billion. Compared to a year ago, when the DIF amounted to $45.2 billion, this is a decline of some 77 percent.

    As at-risk banks continue to deteriorate, the DIF's growing loss provisions have simply outpaced accrued and collected premiums, including a special assessment that was levied on insured institutions at the end of the second quarter. Rather than demand another special assessment, the FDIC is trying a new tactic to deal with the fund's depletion: prepaid premiums.

    According to an FDIC press release, the FDIC Board "has adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) that would require insured institutions to prepay their estimated quarterly risk-based assessments for the fourth quarter of 2009 and for all of 2010, 2011 and 2012." The prepayments should generate roughly $45 billion in cash, a much-needed infusion for the anemic DIF.

    Numbers game

    Time Magazine is calling the tactic "an accounting trick," (http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1926877,00.html?iid=tsmodule ) but FDIC Chair Sheila Bair sees it as a necessary step in the fund's restoration. The move won't impact banks' profitability, since they won't recognize the expenses any sooner under prepayment. It will impact liquidity, but the FDIC's position is that banks have sufficient cash to absorb these prepayments.

    The push for prepayments underscores the FDIC's commitment to manage through this crisis without asking the Treasury or taxpayers to foot the bill.

    Assessment increase ahead

    The aforementioned NPR also included an assessment increase of three basis points across the board, to be made effective on January 1, 2011.

    Topics: FDIC, treasury department, Bank Regulators, Bank Capital, Deposit Insurance, FDIC Insurance Fund, Bank Regulations, Deposit Insurance Fund, Bank Liquiditity, Assessment Plan

    SNL Financial's De novo Digest Article

    Posted by Wendell Brock on Tue, Sep 15, 2009

    SNL recently published an article discussing the FDIC's new policy change on de novo banks. In "Extending Bank's Adolescence," author Christina M. Mitchell writes, the "change effectively extends adolescence for young banks, lengthening the period of increased regulatory supervision required for de novo institutions in a move that industry observers say will heighten the already considerable barriers to opening new banks." Over the past few years, the regulators have nearly shut down the flow of de novo bank openings with a drastic increase in regulatory scrutiny.  As the regulatory approval timeline continues to increase, the capital requirements and start-up expenses of opening a bank have climbed significantly. These challenges are keeping many potential investors on the sidelines, and too few of them are looking for other opportunities to enter the banking industry, such as Buying a Bank

    To read Ms. Mitchell's full article click on the link: Extending Bank's Adolescence.

    Topics: Buy a bank, Banking industry, Bank Regulators, Bank Regulations, bank investors, De Novo Banks, buying a bank

    Supervisory Changes for De Novo Banks

    Posted by Wendell Brock on Fri, Sep 11, 2009

    The FDIC has announced its intention to extend the de novo period for certain new banking institutions. The previous de novo period was three years; the new one will be seven years. This change is significant because newly insured institutions are subject to more scrutiny and higher minimum capital ratios during that de novo period. Along with extending the de novo period, the FDIC will also subject de novos to more risk management examinations and require prior approval for any de novo business plan changes.

    Heightened risk for seven years

    Regulators say the supervisory updates are needed because de novos pose a heightened risk to the banking system. According to the FDIC, too many of the actual failures that occurred in 2008 and 2009 were banks that had been open for fewer than seven years. On top of that, a good number of those failures were banks that had been operating between four and seven years-banks that, under current policy, were not subject to the heightened de novo regulations.

    According to data compiled by FinCriAdvisor (http://www.fincriadvisor.com/2009-09-07/FDICdenovopolicy), twenty-three, or 19.6 percent, of the 109 bank failures occurring between January 1, 2008 and August 21, 2009 were de novos. Of those twenty-three, six were within the three-year de novo period; the rest, 74 percent, failed between their fourth and seventh years of operation.

    Exceptions

    The extended de novo period will apply to existing newly insured institutions as well as banks for which charters have not yet been issued. Since the number of new charters awarded by the FDIC in recent months is relatively minimal, the changes affect existing banks far more than would-be banks. The only de novos that won't be subject to the extension and heightened scrutiny are those that are subsidiaries of eligible holding companies.

    Eligible holding companies must have consolidated assets of $150 million or more. Bank holding companies are required to have BOPEC ratings of at least 2; thrift holding companies must have an A rating.

    Details

    Capital requirement.

    A primary change implied by the extension of the de novo period is an increased capital requirement. De novos are currently required to maintain a Tier 1 leverage ratio of at least 8 percent during the de novo period. A longer de novo period means that young institutions will have to maintain this higher ratio for seven years instead of three.

    Examination frequency

    . Along with extending the de novo period, the FDIC will also increase the frequency of risk management exams for de novo banks. Periodic risk management exams, which begin after the institution's first birthday, will occur once annually rather than once every eighteen months. De novos will have to budget for the extra costs associated with the additional examinations.

    The first year examination requirements for de novos will be as follows:

    • Limited risk management exam during first six months of operation
    • Full risk management exam during first twelve months of operation
    • Compliance exams during first twelve months of operation
    • CRA evaluation during first twelve months of operation

    Thereafter, under the new policy, a risk management exam will be conducted every twelve months until the expiration of the de novo period. Compliance exams and CRA evaluations "will alternate on an annual basis."

    Business plan changes

    . The new policy also requires de novos to get FDIC approval prior to implementing any material changes to the institution's business plan during the seven-year de novo period. Previously, newly insured institutions had to provide the FDIC with a written notice of proposed business plan changes within the three-year de novo period.

    The FDIC argues that experience shows the necessity of this requirement; when newly insured institutions deviate from their original business plans, those deviations can often lead them into areas of business where they do not have adequate risk management expertise or resources. "Significant deviations from approved business plans" was one of several common elements the FDIC identified among troubled institutions that have not yet completed their seventh year of operation.

    Change requests will be reviewed to ensure that:

    • There is a defensible business reason for the change.
    • The de novo has the resources-financial and human-to manage any risks created by the change.

    While this requirement keeps de novos from jumping into risky lines of business without adequate forethought, it also limits the de novo's ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Should the bank implement changes or deviate from the original business plan without FDIC approval, fines or other penalties could result.

    Financial statement updates

    . In the third year of operation, de novos must now provide the FDIC with current financial statements along with strategic plans and projected financial statements covering years four through seven. This applies to existing institutions that are less than three years old, as well as newly chartered institutions. The FDIC will want to know specifically about the de novo's expansion plans, product/service strategies and the outlook for capital expenditures and dividend payments.

    To read the full Financial Institution Letter explaining and defending the altered supervisory procedures, click here: http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2009/fil09050.html

    Topics: FDIC, regulators, Bank Capital, Bank Regulations, tier 1 capital, De Novo Banks, De Novo Banking

    Bank Regulators Propose Liquidity Risk Managements Guidelines

    Posted by Wendell Brock on Wed, Jul 22, 2009

    Bank Regulators Solicit Comments on Proposed Liquidity Risk Managements

    The U.S. federal bank regulators (OCC, FRB, FDIC, OTS) along with the National Credit Union Association (NCUA) have collectively produced a set of guidelines regarding liquidity risk management for financial institutions. The agencies are soliciting public comments on these guidelines through September 4.

    The proposed guidelines define a framework for the identification, measurement and monitoring of funding and liquidity risk; they include specific recommendations for:

    • corporate governance
    • risk mitigation
    • management of intraday liquidity

    The responsibility of board members

    Under the proposed guidelines, an institution's board members are ultimately responsible for managing liquidity risk. The board must therefore establish an appropriate level of risk tolerance for the institution, and then communicate that risk tolerance profile to the internal management team. At least annually, the board should revisit the liquidity strategy to ensure that:

    • current liquidity risks are understood
    • the liquidity policy is still relevant and appropriate
    • the policy is being enforced
    • it is clear internally which senior managers are responsible for making liquidity risk decisions

    Key aspects of an institution's liquidity plan

    The institution's liquidity management plan should:

    • be appropriate given the complexity of the institution's structure and activities
    • identify primary funding sources, both for daily needs and seasonal or cyclical needs
    • define acceptable liquidity strategies, both for expected and unexpected business scenarios
    • address liquidity management in terms of separate currencies and/or business lines, where appropriate
    • address how the liquidity management practices dovetail with broader business strategies and contingency planning

    The plan should establish liquidity projection assumptions and a periodic review process, to ensure that those assumptions continue to be valid over time. Qualitative targets and quantitative objectives should be clearly defined. Examples include:

    • Unpledged liquid asset reserve targets
    • Funding diversification targets
    • Contingent liability exposures
    • Desired asset concentrations
    • Activity exposures
    • Targeted level of unencumbered assets to serve as liquidity cushion

    The guidelines also recommend that senior managers receive liquidity reports at least monthly, or more often when economic conditions are severe. Board members should be evaluating the institution's liquidity position at least quarterly.

    It is also advised that complex institutions make efforts to build liquidity costs into internal product pricing and performance measurement.

    Risk measurement and reporting

    Institutions are expected to measure ongoing liquidity risk with short- and long-term cash flow projections that consider both on- and off-balance sheet items. As part of this process, the institution should have measures in place to ensure the appropriate valuation of assets. Other key components of an appropriate liquidity monitoring strategy include:

    • regular stress testing
    • collateral position management
    • procedures to monitor liquidity across business lines and legal entities
    • procedures to monitor and manage intraday liquidity position

    The report also addresses liquidity risk management practices for holding companies. Read the Proposed Interagency Guidance here and (http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09107a.pdf ) let us know what you think. Are these recommended procedures detailed enough to head off unexpected liquidity crises when economic conditions sour? Have the agencies overlooked key liquidity management tactics? Or are these guidelines too much?

    Topics: Bank Regulators, Bank Regulation, Regulations, Bank Policies, Bank Regulations, Bank Liquiditity

    Bank Deals: FDIC-assisted vs. Unassisted Purchase Transactions

    Posted by Wendell Brock on Thu, Jun 11, 2009

    While the current economic and regulatory environment poses challenges for start-up banks, it also creates some unique opportunities for bank acquisitions.

    A few years ago, comparing the potential of bank start-ups to that of bank acquisitions might have quickly led an investor to believe that de novo was the way to go. But as desperation and uncertainty in the industry rise, seller price expectations have fallen. Combine this trend with regulators’ increased scrutiny of new bank applications, and the scales are tipping in favor of buying a bank, rather than starting a new one.

    Selective purchase, short timeline

    Investing groups have two ways to go in a bank purchase: participate in an FDIC-assisted transaction or buy a bank without the government’s help. In an FDIC-assisted transaction, the buyer can acquire deposits, branches and, maybe most importantly, customer relationships, without getting stuck with bad assets. This is an advantage, but the buyer must also contend with public opinion related to the former bank’s failure. Once the transaction becomes public, those purchased deposits may shrink as customers head elsewhere.

    Assisted transactions also present a very short window of opportunity. The FDIC notifies and collects blind bids from suitors within just a few weeks. Further, due diligence and negotiations occur before any public announcement is made.  

    Trends in the FDIC’s “Problem List” indicate that the availability of FDIC-assisted transactions will likely increase this year. As of the end of the first quarter, the problem list included 305 banks and thrifts. That’s up from 252 at the end of the year and 171 in September of 2008.

    Taking the bad with the good


    Many insured institutions will remain off the problem list, but will seek a change in ownership or additional capital anyway. Opportunistic organization groups that are willing to dig in and evaluate asset quality, stability of deposits, and the competitive landscape, among other things, could turn up some workable deals. Unlike the assisted transaction, the unassisted deal rarely presents the chance to buy assets selectively. But, if the publicity is properly managed, buyers can minimize customer defections related to the “failed bank” stigma.

    Clearly, due diligence in these transactions must be extensive. In the current environment, pricing cannot be justified by multiples; buyers are tasked with looking beyond book value and earnings to evaluate a bank’s incremental earnings power. This is no small task, given the uncertainty about economic conditions, collateral values and the regulatory environment. Since due diligence may actually lead to more questions than answers, buyers must be highly disciplined in valuating their prospective targets and ready to walk away from deals that don’t make sense.

    FactSet Mergerstat LLC has reported that at least 285 U.S. financial institutions were sold last year, which is just 54 percent of the number of transactions reported in 2007.

    Topics: Bailout, FDIC, Bank Opportunities, Banking, Bank Risks, Bank Regulators, Bank Regulations

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