BankNotes ...

The FDIC has announced its intention to extend the de novo period for certain new banking institutions. The previous de novo period was three years; the new one will be seven years. This change is significant because newly insured institutions are subject to more scrutiny and higher minimum capital ratios during that de novo period. Along with extending the de novo period, the FDIC will also subject de novos to more risk management examinations and require prior approval for any de novo business plan changes.

Heightened risk for seven years

Regulators say the supervisory updates are needed because de novos pose a heightened risk to the banking system. According to the FDIC, too many of the actual failures that occurred in 2008 and 2009 were banks that had been open for fewer than seven years. On top of that, a good number of those failures were banks that had been operating between four and seven years-banks that, under current policy, were not subject to the heightened de novo regulations.

According to data compiled by FinCriAdvisor (http://www.fincriadvisor.com/2009-09-07/FDICdenovopolicy), twenty-three, or 19.6 percent, of the 109 bank failures occurring between January 1, 2008 and August 21, 2009 were de novos. Of those twenty-three, six were within the three-year de novo period; the rest, 74 percent, failed between their fourth and seventh years of operation.

Exceptions

The extended de novo period will apply to existing newly insured institutions as well as banks for which charters have not yet been issued. Since the number of new charters awarded by the FDIC in recent months is relatively minimal, the changes affect existing banks far more than would-be banks. The only de novos that won't be subject to the extension and heightened scrutiny are those that are subsidiaries of eligible holding companies.

Eligible holding companies must have consolidated assets of $150 million or more. Bank holding companies are required to have BOPEC ratings of at least 2; thrift holding companies must have an A rating.

Details

Capital requirement.

A primary change implied by the extension of the de novo period is an increased capital requirement. De novos are currently required to maintain a Tier 1 leverage ratio of at least 8 percent during the de novo period. A longer de novo period means that young institutions will have to maintain this higher ratio for seven years instead of three.

Examination frequency

. Along with extending the de novo period, the FDIC will also increase the frequency of risk management exams for de novo banks. Periodic risk management exams, which begin after the institution's first birthday, will occur once annually rather than once every eighteen months. De novos will have to budget for the extra costs associated with the additional examinations.

The first year examination requirements for de novos will be as follows:

• Limited risk management exam during first six months of operation
• Full risk management exam during first twelve months of operation
• Compliance exams during first twelve months of operation
• CRA evaluation during first twelve months of operation

Thereafter, under the new policy, a risk management exam will be conducted every twelve months until the expiration of the de novo period. Compliance exams and CRA evaluations "will alternate on an annual basis."

Business plan changes

. The new policy also requires de novos to get FDIC approval prior to implementing any material changes to the institution's business plan during the seven-year de novo period. Previously, newly insured institutions had to provide the FDIC with a written notice of proposed business plan changes within the three-year de novo period.

The FDIC argues that experience shows the necessity of this requirement; when newly insured institutions deviate from their original business plans, those deviations can often lead them into areas of business where they do not have adequate risk management expertise or resources. "Significant deviations from approved business plans" was one of several common elements the FDIC identified among troubled institutions that have not yet completed their seventh year of operation.

Change requests will be reviewed to ensure that:

• There is a defensible business reason for the change.
• The de novo has the resources-financial and human-to manage any risks created by the change.

While this requirement keeps de novos from jumping into risky lines of business without adequate forethought, it also limits the de novo's ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Should the bank implement changes or deviate from the original business plan without FDIC approval, fines or other penalties could result.

Financial statement updates

. In the third year of operation, de novos must now provide the FDIC with current financial statements along with strategic plans and projected financial statements covering years four through seven. This applies to existing institutions that are less than three years old, as well as newly chartered institutions. The FDIC will want to know specifically about the de novo's expansion plans, product/service strategies and the outlook for capital expenditures and dividend payments.

To read the full Financial Institution Letter explaining and defending the altered supervisory procedures, click here: http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2009/fil09050.html

In July, the FDIC solicited public comments on a proposed policy statement regarding failed bank acquisitions. This policy statement defined new regulations applicable to certain investors of failed banks, with respect to:   

•    Capital commitments
•    The investor’s role as a source of strength for the acquired institution
•    Cross guarantees
•    Affiliate transactions
•    Secrecy law jurisdictions
•    Continuity of ownership
•    Disclosures

Comments

The FDIC received 3190 form letters in support of the policy changes and 61 individual comment letters. A common observation among these comments was that the new requirements would impede the flow of private capital into the banking industry. Specifically, commenters found the 15 percent Tier 1 leverage ratio, the source of strength requirement, and the cross guarantee requirement to be particularly restrictive. Commenters argued that these provisions would competitively disadvantage the banks acquired by private investors. Given this disadvantage, private investors would be more likely to:

•    stay out of banking altogether, or
•    engage in aggressive business activities after the acquisition has closed.

Commenters also noted that private equity fund agreements typically prohibit source of strength and cross guarantee commitments as described by the FDIC’s proposal. The cross guarantee requirement is particularly distasteful because it would require the investor to risk unrelated and legally separate assets.

Provisions that keep private capital out of the banking industry would ultimately impact the DIF negatively, if the result is a greater number of bank failures.

Other commenters, however, supported the increased restrictions on private equity firms, citing the need to keep risky behavior out of the banking system.  

Final provisions

In consideration of the comments, the FDIC affected several changes to the proposed policy statement, including the following hot points:

•    Clarification regarding the firms to which the policy statement applies. The policy statement will not apply to investors in partnership with depository institution holding companies, where the holding company has “a strong majority interest in the acquired bank or thrift and an established record for successful operation of insured banks or thrifts.” Investors holding no more than 5 percent of total voting power are also excluded.
•    Reduction of initial capitalization requirements. The acquired bank must now open with a Tier 1 common equity/total assets ratio of 10 percent. And, this minimum ratio must be maintained for three years.  
•    Removal of the source of strength requirement.
•    Narrowing of the cross guarantee provision. Cross guarantees will only be required when the affected investor group owns more than one institution and those institutions are at least 80 percent owned by common investors.
•    Update to the definition of “affiliate” with respect to affiliate transaction provisions. The final statement defines “affiliate” as: “any company in which the Investor owns, directly or indirectly, at least 10 percent of the equity of such company and has maintained such ownership for at least 30 days.”

Read the summary of comments and complete list of changes made to the final policy statement here: http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/Aug26no1.pdf  

The FDIC first began using loss-sharing arrangements in 1991, as the agency managed its way through the S&L crisis. Community banks benefited from these arrangements. These arrangements are associated with purchase and assumption agreements that transfer a failed bank's assets from the FDIC to a healthy bank. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the loss-sharing arrangement has made a dramatic return to the forefront.

Under a simple loss-sharing deal, the FDIC might agree to absorb 80 percent of the losses associated with a specific pool of non-performing loans that the healthy bank acquires in the transaction. The healthy bank would absorb the first 20 percent of losses arising from that loan book. The FDIC's liability to share in these losses would last for a stated time period, such as three, five or seven years. There would be additional terms governing the deal-including maximum aggregate losses incurred by the healthy bank, FDIC reimbursement of net charge-offs of  shared loss assets, etc.

A proven strategy

Between September of 1991 and January of 1993, the FDIC made loss-sharing arrangements in connection with 24 bank failures. The aggregate value of assets covered by those arrangements was approximately $18.5 billion. After the fact, the FDIC compared the costs of purchase agreements made with and without loss-share arrangements. The agency concluded that loss-share transactions were less expensive than the conventional purchase and assumption agreements, for both large and small banks. http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-07.pdf

Besides reduced resolution costs, there are other advantages associated with loss sharing, including:

Greater incentive for the healthy bank to acquire more than just the failed bank's deposits

• Fewer disruptions for loan customers
• Fewer assets being absorbed and subsequently managed/liquidated by the FDIC 
• Fewer assets being removed from the private sector

FDIC loss-share arrangements have been called a win/win, but they are not without risks. The problem assets may be a distraction to the new management team, even if the potential for financial losses is limited. Where there is no loss-share agreement, the healthy bank takes only the deposits, thus beginning operations with a clean slate.

Today's crisis

In the first seven months of 2009, the FDIC has used loss share in at least 36 out of 64 bank failures. The aggregate value of assets covered by these arrangements is roughly $20 billion. Among the largest 2009 transactions are:

BankUnited FSB, $10.7 billion covered by loss-sharing

• Security Bank of Jones, $1.6 billion covered by loss-sharing
• Vineyard Bank, $1.5 billion covered by loss-sharing
• Temecula Valley Bank, $1.5 billion covered by loss-sharing

A complete list of 2009 bank failures, along with links to the associated Purchase and Assumption agreements is available here: http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html

Given the large number of bank failures over the last 18 months, the FDIC is seeing increased interest from would-be investors interested in purchasing depository assets of the failed institutions. Concern has risen at the regulatory level about whether these new bank owners and investors have the qualifications necessary to keep the acquired assets from returning to the failed assets pool. That concern has led the FDIC to issue a proposed policy statement that would, if adopted, establish a new set of qualifications for investment groups intending to purchase failed bank assets. 

The proposed standards address the following topics:

• Ownership structure
• Capital levels
• Cross guarantees
• Affiliate transactions
• Continuity of ownership
• Secrecy law jurisdictions
• Limitations on the existing owners of the failed institution
• Disclosure requirements

Key measures of the proposal

1. Silo structures will not be deemed eligible for bidding.
2. A Tier 1 leverage ratio of 15 percent is required and must be maintained for three years. After that, the institution must remain "well capitalized."
3. The holding company must agree to sell stock or engage in capital qualifying borrowing to support the depository institution.
4. Investors with interests in more than one FDIC-insured institution have to pledge to the FDIC their proportionate interests in each institution.
5. Loans to investors or investors' affiliates would be prohibited.
6. Investors would have to retain ownership in the institution for at least three years. The FDIC can approve exceptions.
7. Ownership structures involving entities domiciled in bank secrecy jurisdictions will not be eligible bidders.
8. Investors owning 10 percent or more of the failed institution will not be eligible bidders.
9. Investors will have to disclose to the FDIC information pertaining to the size and composition of capital funds, the business plan, the management team, etc.

Bidders subject to proposed rules

Under the current proposal, these rules would only be applicable to certain types of bank acquirers, namely:

• Private capital investors attempting to take ownership of deposit liabilities that are currently in receivership
• De novo institutions applying for FDIC insurance in association with "the resolution of failed insurance depository institutions" 

Balancing capital needs with prudence

While the FDIC is conscious of the need to qualify bidders, regulators are also concerned about placing too many limitations on the inflow of new capital into the banking system. The banking system needs private investor capital. Are these proposed rules going to inhibit the flow of that new capital? Or will the new standards deliver the right amount of prudence? Feel free to sound off!

Read the full FDIC statement here: http://www.thefederalregister.com/d.p/2009-07-09-E9-16077 The proposal policy statement is open for public comments until early-August.

While the current economic and regulatory environment poses challenges for start-up banks, it also creates some unique opportunities for bank acquisitions.

A few years ago, comparing the potential of bank start-ups to that of bank acquisitions might have quickly led an investor to believe that de novo was the way to go. But as desperation and uncertainty in the industry rise, seller price expectations have fallen. Combine this trend with regulators’ increased scrutiny of new bank applications, and the scales are tipping in favor of buying a bank, rather than starting a new one.

Selective purchase, short timeline

Investing groups have two ways to go in a bank purchase: participate in an FDIC-assisted transaction or buy a bank without the government’s help. In an FDIC-assisted transaction, the buyer can acquire deposits, branches and, maybe most importantly, customer relationships, without getting stuck with bad assets. This is an advantage, but the buyer must also contend with public opinion related to the former bank’s failure. Once the transaction becomes public, those purchased deposits may shrink as customers head elsewhere.

Assisted transactions also present a very short window of opportunity. The FDIC notifies and collects blind bids from suitors within just a few weeks. Further, due diligence and negotiations occur before any public announcement is made.  

Trends in the FDIC’s “Problem List” indicate that the availability of FDIC-assisted transactions will likely increase this year. As of the end of the first quarter, the problem list included 305 banks and thrifts. That’s up from 252 at the end of the year and 171 in September of 2008.

Taking the bad with the good

Many insured institutions will remain off the problem list, but will seek a change in ownership or additional capital anyway. Opportunistic organization groups that are willing to dig in and evaluate asset quality, stability of deposits, and the competitive landscape, among other things, could turn up some workable deals. Unlike the assisted transaction, the unassisted deal rarely presents the chance to buy assets selectively. But, if the publicity is properly managed, buyers can minimize customer defections related to the “failed bank” stigma.

Clearly, due diligence in these transactions must be extensive. In the current environment, pricing cannot be justified by multiples; buyers are tasked with looking beyond book value and earnings to evaluate a bank’s incremental earnings power. This is no small task, given the uncertainty about economic conditions, collateral values and the regulatory environment. Since due diligence may actually lead to more questions than answers, buyers must be highly disciplined in valuating their prospective targets and ready to walk away from deals that don’t make sense.

FactSet Mergerstat LLC has reported that at least 285 U.S. financial institutions were sold last year, which is just 54 percent of the number of transactions reported in 2007.

The Wall Street Journal has reported that the Obama administration will recommend an overhaul of the current bank regulatory system to replace several regulators with one super-agency. The plan is said to involve the creation of a systemic regulator and a new consumer protection agency as well.

Currently, banks can be chartered as national banks, state banks, federal savings banks or state savings associations. Each type of charter involves a different set of regulators. For example, national banks are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or OCC. Federal savings banks, however, are regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision or OTS. State banks can be jointly regulated by the state and either the FDIC or the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). State-chartered thrift holding companies and state savings associations, however, are regulated by the state and OTS. The bank’s organization group selects the type of charter and chartering group within its bank application during the formation process.

Competing agencies create gaps and leniencies

Critics of the current system argue that this regulator mélange lacks comprehensive, systemic oversight and creates regulatory gaps that have been exploited by financial companies.

Also at issue is whether the current system sufficiently motivates regulators to provide careful oversight. New banks represent new funding for regulators; since bank organizers tend to gravitate towards the regulator of least resistance, regulators actually benefit on some level from offering greater leniency.

A systemic regulator would eliminate this competition for leniency. The agency would be tasked with identifying and addressing regulatory gaps in areas such as mortgage banking, hedge funds, credit default swaps and other specialty financial products. As well, the entity would be responsible for recognizing risks and problems within financial companies that are heavily entrenched in the industry—to properly manage or even avoid failures of Lehman’s magnitude.  

ABA warns of ending dual-bank system

A single-agency system would require the unification of oversight functions currently managed by the OCC, OTS, FDIC and FRB. In a letter written to Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, ABA President and CEO Edward Yingling expressed the banking industry’s opposition to this concept. According to Yingling, such a system would favor federal banks over state banks, and eventually lead to the end of the dual banking system. The dual banking system, says Yingling, isn’t the enemy; it creates competition and stimulates innovation in financial products and evolution of regulatory systems.

Yingling also argues that the proposed model is based on the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority, which was not able to avert that country’s financial crisis.

The single regulator concept is still just a subject of debate on Capitol Hill. Senator Christopher J. Dodd and Representative Barney Frank have both spoken out against the idea. Press reports indicate that the administration will publicize a proposal later this month.

In the first quarter of 2009, the banking industry rebounded from a net loss in the prior quarter-an improvement that masked mixed performance. The first quarter cumulative net profit of $7.6 billion, the highpoint of the previous four quarters, was more than 60 percent below 2008's first quarter performance. Further, this year's profitability was largely fueled by strong trading revenues and realized gains on securities at large banks. Nearly one-quarter (21.6 percent) of banks reported a net loss, and a majority of banks reported quarter-over-quarter net income declines.  

A $7.6 billion increase in trading revenues boosted noninterest income, with additional contribution coming from increased servicing fees and gains on loan sales. The industry also benefited from an improved net interest margin (NIM), driven primarily by a lower cost of funds. The average NIM of 3.39 percent was slightly higher on a sequential and quarter-over-quarter basis.

Bad loans still a factor

First quarter charge-offs notched a slight sequential decline, but are still outpacing last year's level by almost 100 percent.

C&I loans accounted for most of the year-over-year increase in charge-offs, but credit cards, real estate construction loans and closed end 1-4 family residential real estate loans were also problematic. Net charge-offs in all major categories were higher than a year ago. The total annualized charge-off rate was 1 basis point below the fourth quarter's record-high level.

Noncurrent loans are still on the rise. The percentage of noncurrent loans and leases to total loans and leases rose 81 basis points during the first quarter to 3.76 percent, with the increase being led by real estate loans. Nearly three-fifths (58 percent) of banks indicated that their noncurrent loan balances increased during the first quarter.

Banks added to their reserves again this quarter, pushing the ratio of reserves to total loans up to the record level of 2.5 percent. This reserve building was outpaced by the rise in noncurrent loans, however, such that the ratio of reserves to noncurrent loans declined to 66.5 percent, a 17-year low.

Balance sheets shift

The industry's equity capital rose substantially, partially driven by reduced dividend payments and TARP infusions. The paring down of loan portfolios and trading accounts led to an industry-wide decline in total assets of $302 billion. As a result, the ratio of total deposits to industry assets rose to 66.1 percent, despite a slight decline in total deposits.

Failure rate high, DIF decreasing  

At quarter-end, there were 8,246 FDIC-insured commercial banks and savings institutions, down from 8,305 at year-end. Twenty-one banks failed in the first quarter. The problem list grew in number from 252 to 305, while the assets managed by problem banks increased 38 percent to $220 billion.

Loss provisions (for actual and anticipated failures) drove a 24.7 percent in the DIF during the quarter, bringing the balance to about $13 billion. The 21 failures during the first quarter are estimated to have cost the DIF $2.2 billion. At quarter-end, the reserve ratio was 0.27 percent, its lowest level in 16 years.

New charters approved during the first quarter of 2009 numbered 13, the lowest level since the first quarter of 1994.  There were 50 bank mergers during the quarter.

Seventy-three start-up banks opened their doors in 2008, according to industry data provider SNL Financial. The number compares unfavorably to what happened in years prior: there were 146 start-ups in 2007, 152 in 2006, and 135 in 2005. The drop-off in bank start-up activity has several contributing factors, but a big one is the ever-lengthening approval cycle. FDIC regulators, ever-conscious about squeezing risk out of the banking system and short on manpower, are taking longer and longer to provide final approvals on new bank applications. It appears that each de novo application now has to be sent to Washington DC for final approval.

Two years ago, a start-up bank could set aside about six months to receive an application approval. However, sometime in early-2008, things began to slow down. Now, a bank organizing group can expect twelve months or more to go by as the FDIC ponders the new bank’s worthiness.

Because time is money

The added caution on the part of regulators is understandable, but it doesn’t come without a cost. A de novo bank typically brings $10 to $25 million of new private capital into the industry. SNL Financial estimates that new banks last year brought in an average of $18 million apiece, or roughly $1.3 billion in total. But a look at the same numbers in prior years indicates that this figure could have been much higher; the 146 start-ups in 2007, for example, delivered a cumulative $2.67 billion in new funds to the industry.

Manpower constraints

Caution, unfortunately, isn’t the only obstacle new bank applications face. Another issue is lack of manpower. De novo applications are processed in the examination side of the FDIC. But many of those examination employees are now being diverted to the resolution department that manages the closing of  banks. A typical bank closure can require the participation of ninety or more FDIC employees—which is a lot of human resources to shuttle away from examining banks and application processing. Last year, the FDIC shut down 25 failed institutions; the count this year has nearly matched that figure.  While the FDIC works hard to help banks survive and keep our financial system healthy, they also look for the least costly solution to the insurance fund as they close an institution.

Private capital, ready and willing

At a time when the feds are dumping money into the financial sector to loosen up lending, the banking system could sorely use the extra capital provided by de novo banks. It was just recently that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) increased the expected 2009 cost of TARP by more than $150 billion. The estimated total cost is now $356 billion. Meanwhile, the Obama administration is also tinkering with the idea of selling bailout bonds to generate private capital that could fund bailout efforts.

Given that start-up banks bring their own capital—along with clean balance sheets, banking expertise and a willingness to lend—now might be the opportune time to fast-track bank applications. Finding a way to do that might be a practical addition to the existing banking recovery programs.  

With the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) reserve ratio at its lowest point since June of 1994, the FDIC is currently moving forward on the Restoration Plan that was announced last year. The plan seeks to restore the reserve ratio to the required amount of 1.15 percent within five years; as of September 30, the reserve ratio was 0.76 percent, down from 1.01 percent three months prior.

The Plan involves overhauling the assessment system so that the riskier financial institutions will bear a greater burden in restoring the DIF balance and reserve ratio. As an immediate measure to increase the fund, the FDIC did initiate a 7-basis-point increase to its assessment rates across the board. This change, which created an assessment range of 12 to 50 basis points, was effective only for the first quarter of 2009. The proposed changes for the second quarter are geared towards implementing assessment-pricing calculations that weight an institution’s risk profile appropriately.   

Second quarter brings more robust pricing formulas

The proposed base assessment rate ranges from 10 to 45 basis points. Risk Category I institutions would begin with an initial assessment rate of 10 to 14 basis points; the corresponding assessment rates for Risk Categories II, III, and IV would be 20, 30, and 45 basis points, respectively. Further adjustments would be made to account for the institutions’ unsecured debt, secured liabilities and brokered deposits. The resulting total assessment ranges in basis points by risk category are:

•  I: 8-21
•  II: 18-40
•  III: 28-55
•  IV: 43-77.5

Some points to note regarding the proposed changes to the pricing calculations include:

•  CAMELS component ratings and financial ratios will still be used to determine assessment rates for most institutions. 
•  An additional ratio will be added to increase the assessment rate for institutions that experience rapid asset growth funded by brokered deposits.
•  The pricing calculation used for large Risk Category I institutions will consider the assessment rate from the financial ratios method and other information, in addition to the bank’s weighted-average CAMELS component rating and long-term issuer rating.
•  The FDIC may increase the assessment rate by up to 10 basis points on Risk Category II, III, and IV institutions, when the institution’s ratio of brokered deposits to domestic deposits exceeds 10 percent.
•  Institutions in any category that rely heavily on secured liabilities, such as Federal Home Loan Bank advances, will face an increased assessment rate.
•  Institutions that carry long-term unsecured debt may have their assessment rate reduced as a result.

Bleak outlook

Under this plan, the FDIC expects 2009 assessments to increase to $10 billion, from $3 billion in 2008. The agency had previously estimated bank failure costs of about $40 billion through 2013, but because the economy has worsened since last fall, this estimate is now believed to be too low.

The FDIC’s most recent Quarterly Banking Profile (QBP) confirms the continuation of problems for the banking industry, as several key metrics showed further deterioration in the fourth quarter. These are some highlights:

•    Quarterly earnings declined, swinging industry profitability to a net loss.
•    Loan loss provisions, net charge-offs, defaults and noncurrent loan balances increased.
•    Aggregate outstanding loans and leases decreased.
•    Total deposits increased.
•    Average net interest margin generally improved for larger institutions, but declined for community banks that fund most of their assets with interest-bearing deposits.

Degradation of earnings performance

For the first time since the fourth quarter of 1990, insured commercial banks and savings institutions reported a net quarterly loss. The aggregate loss, which exceeded $26 million, was fueled by a combination of loan loss provisions, trading losses and asset write-downs. Roughly half of the aggregate loss was driven by results at only four banks. But, 32 percent of all insured institutions reported a net loss. The industry’s quarterly return on assets (ROA) was a negative 0.77 percent, the worst quarterly ROA performance since 1987.  

Full-year 2008 net income was slightly more than $16 billion, vs. $100 billion in the year earlier. The full-year ROA was a meager 0.12 percent. These figures were somewhat inflated due to the accounting entries related to failures and mergers; excluding those impacts, the industry would’ve reported a loss for the year.

Loan loss provisions, charge-offs and defaults

Credit quality continued to be problematic. The industry’s loan loss provisions for the quarter were in excess of $69 billion, or more than half of aggregate net operating revenue. Net loan and lease charge-offs were nearly $38 billion, which is more than double the amount recorded in the year-earlier period. Charge-offs for real estate loans, both construction and development loans and residential mortgages, increased more than $10 billion on a combined basis.

At year-end, the industry was strapped with $230.7 billion in noncurrent loans. This compares to $186.6 billion at the end of the third quarter. The sharp increase does not bode well for a near-term lending or housing recovery, particularly since nearly 70 percent of that increase was related to mortgage loans—residential mortgages, C&I loans, home equity loans and other loans secured by real estate.

Trading losses, asset write-downs, declining equity capital

Trading losses in the fourth quarter were large at $9.2 billion, but down from last year’s level of $11.2 billion. Charges associated with goodwill impairments and factors jumped more than $4 billion from last year, to $15.8 billion.

The disappearance of $39.4 billion in goodwill, along with a reduction in other comprehensive income, led to another consecutive reduction in total equity capital.

Total regulatory capital, however, notched an increase of 2.2 percent. At year-end, 97.6 percent of insured banks matched or beat the highest regulator capital standards.

Restructuring reduces loans outstanding

Net loans and leases outstanding slipped by 1.7 percent. The decline was largely attributable to portfolio restructuring by several large institutions.

Mergers and failures shrink the industry

During the fourth quarter, the number of insured institutions shrank by 79. There were 12 failures in the quarter and 15 new charters. The rest of the decline was related to merger activity and FDIC assistance transactions. For the year, 25 banks failed and 98 institutions were chartered.  

As of December 31, the FDIC’s bad bank list contained 252 insured institutions, representing total assets of $159 billion.